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Pragmatic abilities of high-functioning 
Greek-speaking children with autism
THEODOROS MARINIS1, ARHONTO TERZI2
ANGELIKI KOTSOPOULOU3, KONSTANTINOS FRANCIS4
This paper reports on the findings of the pragmatic abilities of Greek-speaking chil-
dren with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Twenty high functioning children with
ASD and their typically developing age and vocabulary controls were administered
a pragmatics task in the context of a larger study targeting the grammar of Greek-speaking children with
autism. The task was based on the Diagnostic Evaluation of Language Variation (DELV) and assessed the
children’s abilities in communicative role taking, narrative, and question asking. The children with ASD
showed an uneven profile in their pragmatic abilities. The two groups did not differ in communicative role tak-
ing and question asking. However, the children with ASD had difficulties on the narrative task, and more
specifically, on the items assessing reference contrast and temporal links. Yet, they performed similarly on
the mental state representations and the false beliefs items. Despite their good performance on mental states
and false beliefs, the ASD children’s lower performance on reference contrast can be interpreted via Theory
of Mind deficits if we assume that the former involve an additional level of complexity; namely, quantifying the
amount of information available to the listener. Lower performance on temporal links is in line with the ASD
children’s attested difficulties in organizing events into a coherent gist. Their overall profile, and, in particular,
the dissociation between the different sections of the task, does not support single deficit accounts. It rather
indicates that the deficits of individuals with ASD stem from distinct deficits in core cognitive processes (Hap-
pé & Frith, 2006).
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1. Introduction
Autism is a developmental disorder (World
Health Organization, 1993). Among its diagnostic
features are delays and deficits in language
acquisition and primary impairments in pragmatic
aspects of language in both expression and
comprehension (Roberts, Rice & Tager-Flusberg,
2004; Tager-Flusberg, 2000). Particular aspects of
pragmatics that are affected are: an inability to
conform to conversational rules, violations of
Grice’s maxims, interpreting statements in a literal
manner, failure to take into account the distinction
between given and new information and difficulties
in structuring narratives (Diehl, Bennetto, & Young,
2006; Tager-Flusberg, 2000). 
Three main accounts have been put forward to
explain the language deficits of individuals with
ASD: 1) The weak central cohesion account,
according to which individuals with ASD have a
tendency to interpret utterances in isolation at the
expense of the global picture (Frith, 1989; Happé
& Frith, 2006). As a result they have difficulties in
organizing pieces of information into a coherent
gist. 2) The deficits in Theory of Mind (ToM)
account, according to which pragmatic deficits
result from a developmental impairment in ToM
(e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Happé,
1993); 3) The executive function (EF) deficits
account, according to which individuals with ASD
have deficits in EFs that lead to global difficulties
with planning and organization (e.g., Pennington
& Ozonoff, 1996). Finally, it is possible that the
pattern of performance in individuals with ASD is
not reducible to a single deficit but results from a
number of distinct abnormalities in core cognitive
processes (global-local processing, social cognition,
and executive functions) (Happé & Frith, 2006). The
last account differs from the previous ones because
it predicts that individuals with ASD may show
deficits in only some but not all core cognitive
processes and is important for studies that test a
range of abilities, such as the present study.
To date, very few studies have investigated the
language abilities in Greek-speaking children with
ASD. Only two studies addressed the pragmatic
abilities by interviewing children’s parents
(Vogindroukas, 2005), or by assessing the children
themselves on a single aspect of pragmatics, the
comprehension of idioms (Vogindroukas, 2010).
Therefore, there is a gap in studies addressing a
range of pragmatic abilities of Greek-speaking
children with ASD, and moreover, within the same
group of children. The present study fills this gap by
using an adaptation of the Diagnostic Evaluation of
Language Variation (DELV) (Seymour, Roeper, de
Villiers, & de Villiers, 2005). 
The study aims at documenting the strengths
and weaknesses of a range of language abilities
that fall within the remit of the pragmatics domain
in Greek-speaking children with ASD, using the
pragmatics subtest of the DELV. This subtest
includes sections on communicative role-taking,
question asking, and a narrative task assessing
reference, temporal cohesion, mental state
representations and false beliefs. Hence, it enables
us to address accounts that have been proposed
to explain the pragmatic difficulties in ASD. The
accounts make different predictions for the
children’s performance in the various sections of
the task. The weak central cohesion account
predicts difficulties with the narrative task in terms
of reference and temporal cohesion. However, it
does not predict difficulties in communicative role-
taking, asking questions, and false beliefs. The
deficits in ToM account predicts deficits in
communicative role-taking, asking questions,
mental state representations and false beliefs. The
EF deficits account predicts difficulties in all
sections of the pragmatics task because all
sections require planning and organization. Finally,
the multiple deficits account predicts dissociations
between the children’s performance in the various
sections of the pragmatics task. 
In the present study, the children with ASD had
non-verbal abilities within norms and were matched
to a group of age-matched peers on their verbal
abilities in order to be able to distinguish between
deficits due to general low abilities and deficits due
to ASD. Moreover, a narrow age-range was
selected in order to control for the heterogeneity
in the sample.
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Pragmatic abilities in individuals with ASD
The pragmatic abilities of children with ASD can
be assessed by using a variety of tasks, including
judgment, false belief, and narrative tasks. Surian,
Baron-Cohen, & van der Lely (1996) investigated
the children’s ability to conform to conversational
rules and to detect violations of Grice’s maxims
using an acceptability judgment task. A false belief
task was used along with the judgment task to
investigate the relationship between the ability to
detect violations of Grice’s maxims and passing
false belief tasks. Eight children with autism (mean
age: 12;11 years), eight age-matched children with
SLI (mean age: 11;10 years), and eight younger
(mean age: 6;7 years) typically developing (TD)
children took part in this study. The three groups
were tested on their verbal abilities on the basis of
the Test of the Reception of Grammar (TROG)
(Bishop, 1983). The children with ASD had very low
verbal age (5;7 years), which was similar to the
children with SLI (5;9 years) and considerably lower
than their chronological age peers (12;11 years).
The judgment task consisted of a set of brief
conversations, some of which violated Grice’s
maxims. Children had to identify which people ‘said
something silly’. They were also administered the
Sally-Ann task in order to assess their false belief
abilities. Both tasks require ToM because to
complete the tasks successfully, participants have
to be able to take into account someone else’s
perspective. This involves inhibiting their own
perspective, and therefore, it requires good EF
abilities. Failing these tasks could provide evidence
for a ToM deficit or a deficit in EFs. The judgment
task also involves social cognition. If children failed
only one of the two tasks, this would provide
evidence for the multiple deficits account because
it would indicate that the two abilities can be
impaired independently from each other. Three of
the eight children with ASD, all children with SLI and
all typically developing children performed above
chance and passed the false belief task. However,
the remaining five children with ASD were at chance
level on the judgment task and did not pass the
false belief task. These findings indicate that a large
number of children with ASD have difficulties in
detecting pragmatic violations and there is an
association between this ability and passing a false
belief task. This association supports the ToM and
the EFs deficit accounts. Clearly there was no
dissociation between the two abilities, but this does
not necessarily provide evidence against the
multiple deficits account because the sample size
was very small. Children may also have had
concurrent deficits in ToM and EFs. Moreover, there
was considerable individual variation. As mentioned
above, more than a third of the children with ASD
did not have low per formance on the judgment task
and passed the false belief task. This raises the
question as to whether or not all children with ASD
have difficulties in the aspects of pragmatics tested
(Grice’s maxims, false beliefs). In addition, since the
children with ASD had low verbal abilities, it is
unclear whether the difficulties in the judgment and
false belief tasks were related to their low verbal
abilities.
Narrative tasks can assess a large range of
language abilities, including morpho-syntax,
semantics, and pragmatics. Since the present
paper addresses pragmatics, we will focus mainly
on aspects of narratives that reflect pragmatic
abilities. Pragmatic abilities within a narrative can
be measured, among others, by analysing the
structure and the cohesion of the narrative, and the
use of referential expressions, such as articles and
pronouns, the choice of which requires taking into
account the interlocutor’s point of view and
whether something is old or new information. 
Studies on the narrative abilities of children with
ASD have focused on story length, structure,
cohesion, and the use of referential expressions
(e.g. Colle, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & van der
Lely, 2008; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1995).
Studies that matched children with ASD to TD
controls on their language abilities showed few
quantitative differences between the groups in
measures that are assumed to tap into grammatical
abilities, such as, narrative length, structure, and
complexity (Colle, et al., 2008; Diehl et al., 2006;
Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1995). Some studies,
however, have found a relationship between
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narrative abilities and ToM in children with ASD
(Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1995) and qualitative
differences in the structure of narratives, and the use
of referring expressions. Narrating a story in a
structured way requires the ability to see the global
picture of the story and the ability to plan and
organize the sentences in a coherent way.
Difficulties in narrative structure would provide
evidence for the weak cohesion or the EFs deficit
account. Correct use of referring expressions
requires being able to take the listener’s perspective.
This requires good ToM and EFs in relation to
planning and organization. Difficulties in the use of
referring expressions would provide evidence for the
ToM and EFs deficit accounts. In terms of the
structure of narratives, children with ASD had
difficulties in retelling a story as a meaningful chain
of events, creating thematically integrated narratives
and using clear cohesive links in their expressions
when retelling a personal narrative (Losh & Capps,
2003) or a story from a storybook (Diehl et al., 2006).
Their narratives were often reminiscent of listings of
events rather than structured narratives with causal
connectedness (Diehl et al., 2006). In terms of the
use of referring expressions, Nadig, Vivanti, &
Ozonoff (2009) demonstrated that some children
with ASD were using under-informative expressions
(the cup instead of the short cup) when a modifier
was required from the context and some were more
likely to use an over-informative expression (the
short cup instead of the cup) when the modifier was
not required. Moreover, Colle, et al. (2008) found
that adults with ASD often used full noun phrases
(the boy) instead of pronouns (he) to maintain
reference, and also used more ambiguous
pronouns than TD adults. Nadig et al. (2009) and
Colle et al. (2008) interpreted these results to show
that individuals with ASD are less likely to take into
account the perspective of the hearer. Along the
same lines, Arnold, Bennetto, & Diehl (2009)
investigated the use of referential expressions
(names, descriptions, overt pronouns, zero
pronouns) in the narratives of 9-to-17 year old high
functioning individuals with ASD and a group of TD
controls matched on age, gender, verbal, and non-
verbal abilities. Although children with ASD showed
sensitivity to discourse context, the younger children
with ASD (9-12 years old) were less likely to produce
overt and zero pronouns in contexts that required
them, especially when an entity was already
introduced into the discourse but not in the previous
clause, and used names and full noun phrases
instead. 
As the studies presented so far indicate, a large
heterogeneity has been well documented in the
language abilities of children with ASD, including
their pragmatic abilities. Individual variability holds
not only for the language abilities of children with
ASD; there is also large individual variation in the
symptoms of autism, which vary in severity and
span along a continuum. To some extent, variation
can be traced back to the inclusion and exclusion
criteria of the studies. Several studies include small
samples of individuals with ASD with a large age
range, including children and adolescents. Age
heterogeneity can introduce noise to the data related
to developmental aspects of language and cognition.
Other studies include high and low functioning
individuals with ASD or high functioning individuals
with ASD with high and low verbal abilities. By using
such heterogeneous groups, it is very difficult to tease
apart effects of low non-verbal abilities and effects of
low language abilities from effects related to the
clinical status of the children. And yet, heterogeneity
in the profile of children with ASD has been
demonstrated, even in studies that matched
individuals with ASD to TD individuals on all three
factors: chronological age, non-verbal, and verbal
abilities (e.g., Diehl et al., 2006; Arnold et al., 2009).
To control for heterogeneity as much as possible, the
study reported here included only children within a
narrow age range and used very strict inclusion and
exclusion criteria, allowing better discrimination
between the accounts that could explain pragmatic
difficulties in children with ASD.
Language abilities in Greek-speaking
children with ASD
Very few studies so far have addressed the
language abilities of Greek-speaking individuals
with autism. Vogindroukas (2005) investigated
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communication skills of Greek children with ASD
by interviewing the children’s parents. This was
accomplished via the Pragmatics Profile of Early
Communication Skills tool (Dewart & Summers,
1988), which assesses four domains of
communication: Communicative Functions,
Responses to Communication, Interaction and
Conversation, and Contextual Variation. This study
compared 12 low-verbal children with ASD (mean
age: 84 months) to 12 children with Down’s
syndrome (mean age: 96 months) who had similar
verbal and non-verbal abilities. The study found
that the children with ASD differed from otherwise
similar children with Down’s syndrome on only 14
of the 39 skills that the tool examines. This is in line
with findings from English, according to which
children with ASD were found to fall behind on 17
of the 39 skills of the tool. The main finding of this
study is that the children with ASD wish to
communicate and interact with others, but fall
behind on the means via which they invite
communication and interaction. 
In a more recent study, the pragmatic abilities
of Greek children with ASD were examined directly
(Vogindroukas, 2010). Eleven children with
Asperger (mean age: 11.44 years) were compared
with 11 children with SLI of similar non-verbal
abilities (mean age: 10.85 years), 10 typically
developing children (mean age: 12.62 years), and
11 adults on the comprehension of Greek idioms.
The study demonstrated that children with SLI
performed much better than children with
Asperger, while typically developing children
performed almost at ceiling and did not differ
significantly from adults. This pretty much exhausts
the pragmatics related studies that have been
conducted on Greek-speaking populations.
There is one more large scale study of Greek-
speaking children with ASD, which, however,
investigated grammatical abilities, i.e., morpho -
syntax (see Terzi, Marinis, Francis, & Kotsopoulou,
2012; Terzi, Marinis, Kotsopoulou, & Francis,
2014). This study focused on 20 high functioning
children with autism (mean age: 80 months) and
compared them with typically developing children
matched on age, verbal, and non-verbal abilities.
The areas of grammar investigated were reference
of reflexive and personal pronouns (both, strong
pronouns and clitics), and the comprehension of
non-active morphology. The results showed that
the two groups only showed a difference on the
compre hension of clitic pronouns, an area that
develops early in TD children. Clitic pronouns have
also been found to be a problem in young children
with SLI (Smith, 2008; Stavrakaki & van der Lely,
2010; Tsimpli, 2001; Tsimpli & Stavrakaki, 1999; cf.
Manika, Varlokosta, & Wexler, 2011). The above
study conducted a number of language baseline
tasks, including a pragmatics task based on the
Diagnostic Evaluation of Language Variation (DELV)
(Seymour et al., 2005) and the Diagnostic Verbal IQ
Test (DVIQ) (Stavrakaki & Tsimpli, 2000) that taps
into morphosyntax. The two groups did not differ on
their morphosyntactic abilities but they differed
significantly in their scores on the pragmatics task. 
The present study is the first systematic study
addressing a wide range of pragmatic abilities in
high functioning Greek-speaking children with
ASD. It focuses on the pragmatics task used in
Terzi et al. (2012, 2014)1 and presents in detail
which subtests of the DELV showed differences
between the two groups and were affected in the
children with ASD.
2. Methodology
Participants
Twenty-three 5- to 8-year-old children with
autism (mean: 79.8 months; SD: 10.4; range: 61-
107; girls = 1) and twenty-three age-matched
(mean: 81.1 months; SD: 8.7; range: 66-96; girls =
8) typically developing children (F (1, 39) = 0.184,
p = 0.67; η2 = 0.005) were recruited to take part in
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this study. The two groups had a mixed socio-
economic status. Strict inclusion and exclusion
criteria were used as follows. Inclusion criterion for
the children with ASD was an age range between 5
and 8 years and a clinical diagnosis using DSM-IV-
TR criteria (APA, 1994), corroborated with the use
of Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule -
ADOS-2 (Lord et al., 2000). The specific age range
was selected in order to capture the language
abilities of the children around the first years of
primary school, which is at the age of 6 in Greece.2
The children with ASD had a mean ADOS-2 score
of 17.5 (SD: 4.55). Exclusion criterion for all
children was a score below 80 on the Raven’s
Coloured Progressive matrices (Raven, 1998).
Three children with ASD had a score below 80 and
were excluded from this study along with their three
matched TD children.3 Exclusion criterion for the
TD children was a history of speech and/or
language impairment or an ASD diagnosis. None
of the TD children had a history of speech and/or
language impairment or an ASD diagnosis. The
ASD and the TD children were individually matched
(+/-5 points) on the raw score of a vocabulary test
(maximum score 204, see procedures). The
children with ASD were recruited from intervention
centres specialized for children with ASD, primarily
in Athens. The TD children were recruited from
mainstream schools in Patras.
Measures and procedures
Baseline tasks
The Raven’s Coloured Progressive matrices
(Raven, 1998) measured the children’s non verbal
abilities. A receptive vocabulary task in a format
based on the PPVT (Dunn & Dunn, 1997) was used
to match the children’s receptive vocabulary. The
production of morphosyntax subtest of the
Diagnostic Test of Verbal Intelligence (DVIQ,
Stavrakaki & Tsimpli, 2000) was used to measure
the children’s morphosyntactic abilities. A picture-
pointing comprehension task was used to measure
the children’s comprehension of pronouns and
non-active morphology (Terzi et al., 2014). 
Pragmatics task
To measure the children’s pragmatic abilities,
we adapted the pragmatics subtest of the DELV
(Seymour, et al., 2005) into Greek (see de Villiers,
2004, for a discussion of the pragmatics subtest).
The pictures and contexts used in the pragmatics
section of the DELV do not have any culturally
specific features that would make them not suitable
for the Greek context; therefore, there was no need
to change any of the pictures or stories. The stories
were translated into Greek using vocabulary
appropriate for the age range of the children. The
task consists of three sections: 1) Communicative
Role-Taking, 2) Short Narrative, 3) Question
Asking, and thus, addresses a range of pragmatic
abilities, as described below. 
The Communicative Role-Taking section tests
the ability to take the perspective of another
speaker and use an appropriate speech act in a
particular communication situation. It consists of
four items: item 1 involves reporting an event, items
2 and 3 requesting something, and item 4
prohibiting something. 
The Short Narrative section assesses linguistic
cohesion and the ability to refer to the mental states
of the characters in the story. The child looks at six
pictures that are not visible to the experimenter and
has to tell a story without the experimenter being
able to see the pictures. After the child has told the
story, both the adult and the child can see the
pictures and the adult asks two questions about the
story. This section consists of four items that assess
the children’s ability to refer to characters
contrastively (Item 5), to provide temporal
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expressions to link events in time (Item 6), and to
refer to mental states of characters when telling a
story (Items 7 and 8). Items 5 and 6 are assessed
based on the story telling. The pictures show two
characters of the same gender who need to be
referred to contrastively throughout the story (e.g.
using adjectives young brother, old brother) in order
for the listener to understand which character is
involved (Item 5). The story has important temporal
relationships between the events in the pictures that
have to be expressed in a cohesive way (e.g. using
coordination (and) then or subordination after,
because) (Item 6). Items 7 and 8 are based on the
answers provided by the children after the story.
Item 7 tests whether the child refers to the
character’s actions (e.g., the boy is looking under
the bed), whether the child refers to his
intentions/desires (e.g., he wants to play with his
toy), or to the cognitive state of the character (e.g.,
he is thinking about the toy). Item 8 is a standard
ToM question that assesses whether or not the child
will be able to explain the behaviour of a character
in a story in accordance to a false belief. 
The Question Asking section addresses the
ability to ask questions in order to obtain specific
information. It consists of nine items testing
argument and adjunct questions. The argument
questions comprise a pjos-who-subject-animate
question, a pjon-who-object-animate question, a ti-
what-object-inanimate question, and a pjos/ti-
who/what double-wh-question (see below some
key cross-linguistic differences between Greek and
English). The adjunct questions comprise two pu-
where questions, two-jiati-why questions, and one
pos-how question. In this section, children are not
penalised for morphosyntactic errors. The double-
wh-question assesses the children’s understanding
of the distributive set properties of multiple wh-
questions. This structure is acquired late and even
nine year old children are often unable to produce
this item correctly in English (de Villiers, 2004).
There are two cross-linguistic differences
between English and Greek in this section. In
Greek, the who animate subject and object wh-
words are marked for case, i.e., there is a different
form for the subject and the object wh-word,
namely, pjos=nominative and pjon=accusative.
Thus, case marking provides a cue for the syntactic
function of the wh-word (subject, object). There is
no case marking in what inanimate wh-words
which have the same form for subjects and objects
(ti=nominative and accusative). The other
difference is that in English, the wh-words where
and how share one part of their morphological
make up with the quantifiers somewhere and
somehow which are used by the experimenter to
elicit the questions, but this does not hold for who
and what (someone, something). In Greek all four
wh-words share one part: pjos-nom/pjon-acc (who),
kapjos-nom/kapjon-acc (someone); ti (what), kati
(something), pu (where), kapu (somewhere); pos
(how), kapos (somehow) (Giannakidou, 2012). 
3. Results
Table 1 shows the children’s performance on
the baseline tasks. The two groups did not differ
from each other in their non-verbal abilities (F (1,
39) = 2.062, p = 0.159; η2 = 0.051) and in their
vocabulary (F (1, 39) = 0.002, p = 0.961; η2 <
0.001). The children with ASD had a slightly lower
performance in the production of morphosyntax,
but this difference did not reach significance (F (1,
39) = 3.274, p = 0.078; η2 = 0.079).
Overall accuracy on the pragmatics task
Figure 1 shows the participants’ accuracy in the
three sections of the pragmatics task: commu -
nicative role-taking, narrative, and questions. The
percentages represent the children’s accuracy out of
the items correct and not the proportion of children
who provided a correct response.
To investigate differences between the two
groups and the three parts of the task, we
conducted an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with
Group as the between subjects factor (ASD, TD),
and Section (Communicative Role-Taking,
Narrative, Questions) as the within subjects factor.
This showed a significant difference between the
groups (F (1, 38) = 7.219, p = 0.011, η2 = 0.16), a
significant difference between the sections of the
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task (F (2, 76) = 20.427, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.35), and
a significant interaction between group and
sections (F (2, 76) = 3.116, p = 0.05, η2 = 0.076).
This demonstrates that the groups performed
differently in only some of the sections of the
pragmatics task. Comparison between the two
groups in each one of the sections using Bonferroni
correction (significance level p = 0.006) showed
significantly lower scores in the children with ASD
compared to the TD children only in the narrative
section (F (1, 39) = 14.267, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.273).
Within-group comparisons showed that children
with ASD were less accurate in the narrative than
in the communicative role-taking section and the
questions (communicative role-taking vs. narrative:
p < 0.001; questions vs. narrative: p = 0.001), but
there was no significant difference between
communicative role-taking and questions. In the TD
children, there was no significant difference
between the three subcomponents of the task. In
sum, the children with ASD did not show lower
performance across the board in the pragmatics
task; the only difference between the groups was
attested in the narrative task.
In the following sections we present the results
for each section separately in order to address
between and within group differences in more
detail.
Communicative Role-Taking section
Figure 2 shows the performance of the two
groups on the items that make up the
communicative role-taking section: Telling, Asking,
Prohibiting.
To investigate difference between telling,
asking and prohibiting within and between the
groups, we conducted an ANOVA with Group as
the between subjects factor (ASD, TD), and
Communicative Role-Taking Type (Telling, Asking,
Prohibiting) as the within subjects factor. This
showed a significant difference between the three
types (F (2, 76) = 3.739, p = 0.028, η2 = 0.09) with
Asking showing marginally significantly lower
accuracy than Prohibiting (p = 0.056). There was
no significant difference between the groups and
no interaction between group and types. 
Narrative section 
Figure 3 shows the performance of the two
groups in the items of the narrative section that
comprises of Reference Contrast, Temporal Links,
Mental State Representations, and False Belief items.
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Table 1
Comparison between the ASD and TD children on the baseline tasks 
*Non-verbal IQ: standard score
†DVIQ, Vocabulary: raw score
Group Non-verbal IQ* Vocabulary† DVIQ†
ASD children
Mean 103.5 102.3 19.9
SD 13.1 22.7 2.9
Range 80-135 57-143 12-24
TD children 
Mean 98 102.7 21.3
SD 11.1 22.8 1.6
Range 80-120 62-141 19-24
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Figure 1
Participants’ performance on communicative role-taking, narrative, 
and questions (% correct)
Figure 2
Participants’ performance on Telling, Asking, and Prohibiting (% correct)
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Figure 3
Participants’ performance on the narrative items (% correct)
Figure 4
Participants’ performance on different questions types (% correct)
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To investigate difference between the four
categories in the narrative section within and
between the groups, we conducted an ANOVA with
Group as the between subjects factor (ASD, TD),
and Type (Reference Contrast, Temporal Links,
Mental State Representation, False Belief) as the
within subjects factor. This showed a significant
difference between the two groups (F (1, 38) =
17.181, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.311), a significant
difference between the four types (F (3, 114) =
6.442, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.145) and a significant
interaction between group and types (F (3, 114) =
4.164, p = 0.008, η2 = 0.099). Between group
analyses with Bonferroni correction (significance
level p = 0.003) showed that children with ASD
were significantly less accurate than TD children
in Reference Contrast (F (1, 39) = 16.102, p <
0.001, η2 = 0.298) and Temporal Links (F (1, 39)
= 12.667, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.25), but they did not
differ in Mental State Representations and False
Beliefs. Within-group comparisons showed that
children with ASD performed less well in Temporal
Links (27.5%) than in Mental State Representations
(67.5%) (p = 0.002). TD children performed better
in Reference Contrast (95%) than in Temporal
Links (62.5%) (p < 0.001) and False Beliefs (62.5%)
(p < 0.012). 
Questions section 
Figure 4 shows the children’s performance on
each question type.
To investigate differences between the seven
question types within and between the groups, we
conducted an ANOVA with Group as the between
subjects factor (ASD, TD), and Question (Who-
subject, Who-object, What, Where, Why, How,
double-wh) as the within subjects factor. This
showed a significant difference between the
question types (F (6, 228) = 74.199, p < 0.001, η2
= 0.661), no difference between the two groups
and no significant interaction between group and
question types. Pairwise comparisons with
Bonferroni correction (significance level p = 0.001)
showed that the children were less accurate in
double wh-questions than in all other question
types (p < 0.001) and also were less accurate in
how questions than in what questions (p = 0.001).
There was no significant difference between the
other question types.
It should be noted that none of the ASD
children and only one of the 20 TD children used
a double wh-question. The majority of the children
from both groups used a single ti-what wh-question
(e.g., ti trone = what eat ‘what do they eat’; ti trone
i anthropi = what eat the people ‘what do the
people eat’) and some children used the quantifiers
o kathenas = everyone (e.g., ti troi o kathenas =
what eat the everyone ‘what does everyone eat’)
and oli = all (e.g., ti trone oli = what eat all ‘what do
they all eat’).
Correlations between the subparts of the
pragmatics task
To investigate if there is a relationship between
the subparts of the pragmatics task we conducted
Pearson’s correlations between the items tapping
communicative role-taking, the items in the narrative
section, and the items in the section with questions
for each group separately. The analyses showed a
strong correlation between communicative role-
taking and questions (r (38) = 0.741, p < 0.001) and
a moderate correlation between narratives and
questions (r (38) = 0.603, p = 0.005) for the TD
children, but no correlations for the children with ASD.
4. Discussion
This study aimed at documenting the strengths
and weaknesses of a range of pragmatic abilities in
Greek-speaking children with ASD and by so doing
to also address accounts that have been proposed
to explain the pragmatic difficulties in ASD. The
main findings of this study can be summarised as
follows. The performance of the children with ASD
differed among the sections of the task. The
children with ASD did not differ from the TD
children in the Communicative Role-Taking
(reporting, requesting, prohibiting) and in Question
Asking (arguments, adjuncts, double-wh
questions), but they were less accurate than the TD
children in the Short Narrative. Within the Short
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Narrative section, the items that showed
differences between the two groups were the ones
assessing reference contrast and temporal links,
while there was no difference between the two
groups on the items tapping mental state
representations and false beliefs. In terms of the
relationship between the sections of the task, there
was a correlation between the TD children’s scores
on the Short Narrative, Communicative Role-
Taking, and Questions, but no correlations
between the sections was attested in the children
with ASD. We consider this an important finding of
our study. In the remaining section we will first
comment briefly on the adaptation of the
pragmatics section of the DELV in Greek as a tool
to assess children’s pragmatic abilities, and,
subsequently, we will discuss our findings in
relation to previous studies on the pragmatic
abilities of children with ASD and the predictions
that follow from the accounts that have been
proposed to explain the difficulties of children with
ASD in this domain of grammar. The section will
end with limitations of the present study and
suggestions for future research.
Adapting the pragmatics section of the
DELV as a tool measuring pragmatic
abilities in Greek-speaking children
The pictures and stories of the DELV
pragmatics section did not require any changes of
the original material, as they were appropriate in
the Greek context. Both groups of children had no
difficulties to understand what they had to do in
each of the three sections of the task and none of
the items, apart from the item eliciting a double wh-
question,4 created particular difficulties. 
A general comment regards the number of
items and points distributed among the three
subsections of the task. A similar number of points
is allocated to each of the three sections
(Communicative Role-Taking: 9; Short Narrative: 7;
Question Asking: 9), but there are fewer items in the
Communicative Role-Taking (N = 4) and in the
Short Narrative (N = 4) than in the Question Asking
section (N = 9). The number of items addressing
the children’s attribution of mental states (N = 2) is
underrepresented compared to the number of items
addressing the children’s ability to ask questions
in order to obtain specific information (N = 9), an
area that heavily involves syntax, and hence, it does
not test only pragmatics. Therefore, the results on
the children’s attribution of mental states may be
less reliable than the results addressing questions
and should be treated with caution.
Pragmatic abilities of Greek children 
with ASD 
Previous research on the pragmatic abilities of
high functioning children with ASD has highlighted
deficits in a variety of tasks, ranging from inability to
conform to conversational rules, violating Grice’s
maxims, difficulties in interpreting non-literal meaning
and metaphoric expressions, difficulties in taking into
account the distinction between old and new
information, difficulties in structuring narratives and
failing false belief tasks (e.g., Diehl et al., 2006;
Tager-Flusberg, 2000). The weak central cohesion
account, deficits in ToM, and deficits in executive
functions have been proposed to account for these
difficulties. A more recent view is that the various
deficits encountered by individuals with ASD are not
reduced to a single aetiology, but are caused by
multiple deficits affecting core cognitive processes
(global-local processing, social cognition, and
executive functions) (Happé & Frith, 2006).
The findings of the present study showed a
dissociation between the sections of the
pragmatics task. The children’s performance in the
sections and items that require the ability to take
the perspective of another speaker and use ToM
did not differ from that of the TD children: they were
able to make an appropriate speech act, to report
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5. This item showed a floor effect, but this is in line with data on English showing that double wh-questions are
acquired late (de Villiers, 2004).
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an event, request something, prohibit something,
and ask questions in order to obtain specific
information. This indicates that they did not show
deficits in social cognition. They were also able to
refer to the mental state of the characters in the
narrative task and they did not fail the false belief
question. This is in contrast to the study by Surian
et al. (1996) who found that five out of the eight
children in their study were at chance level in an
acceptability judgment task and did not pass a
false belief task. The difference between the results
by Surian et al. and our study are very likely to
relate to differences in the verbal abilities of the
children in the two studies. Although the study by
Surian et al. included high functioning children with
ASD, the children’s verbal abilities (mean verbal
age = 5;7 years) were around six years below their
chronological age (12;11 years) and their verbal
abilities were matched to the verbal abilities of
children with SLI. This indicates that although high
functioning, the children in that study had language
delay/impairment. In contrast, in the present study
there was no discrepancy between the verbal and
non-verbal abilities of the children with ASD, who
had similar vocabulary and morphosyntactic
abilities to their TD chronological controls. This
difference could indicate that the deficits attested in
Surian et al. are not caused by a deficit in ToM per
se, but by a combination of deficits in ToM and
language delay/impairment that both impact on the
acceptability judgment and the false belief tasks.
Moreover, our findings are in line with previous
research in the language abilities of high
functioning children with ASD showing that not all
children have difficulties with tasks involving ToM
(e.g., Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994) and that
some children with ASD pass false belief tasks,
especially those with high verbal abilities (Fisher,
Happé, & Dunn, 2005; Happé, 1995). 
The children with ASD in our study were less
accurate than the TD children in the items of the
narrative task that require the ability to make
reference to the characters of the story
contrastively in order to enable the listener of the
story identify the characters. In those items, the
children in our study used under-informative
expressions, e.g., the boy, he, instead of the big
boy, the older brother. As a result, the listener could
not identify who the child was referring to. Similar
types of errors have been documented in several
studies using narrative tasks for storytelling and for
personal narratives. In the study by Nadig, et al.
(2009), children with ASD were shown to have
difficulties in using the right amount of information
to indicate to the listener which object they were
referring to. In some cases, they used under-
informative expressions, that is, they failed to make
reference to objects contrastively, for example
using adjectives (the short cup). In a similar vein,
Colle et al. (2008) found that adults with ASD
sometimes used ambiguous pronouns in the
narratives that did not enable the listener to
ascertain who they were referring to. 
Using the appropriate referring expressions to
indicate to the listener which character one refers
to involves ToM. This raises the question of why the
children were able to use ToM to make an
appropriate speech act, to refer to mental states,
and to pass false belief questions, but they were
using under-informative expressions to refer to the
characters of the story. Although all these items
involved ToM, we believe that being able to use
appropriate referential expressions is more
demanding than being able to take someone else’s
perspective to use the right speech act, or referring
to mental states and passing false belief tasks. We
believe this is so because using the right referential
expressions involves not only taking into account
the listener’s perspective, but also quantifying the
amount of information available to the listener in
order to convey the message. This latter process,
involves also global-local processing and adds one
more level of complexity, requiring higher level of
planning and organization. 
The second area in which the children with
ASD scored lower than the TD children regards
providing temporal expressions to link the events of
the narrative in a coherent way. Children with ASD
did not link events using subordination (after,
because), but used coordination instead (and then)
or did not link the events at all. This is in line with
studies showing that children with ASD have
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difficulties in telling a story as a meaningful chain of
events (Diehl et al., 2006; Losh & Capps, 2003) and
their narratives resemble listings of events,
indicating that they may have difficulties in
organizing events into a coherent gist, and instead,
they describe them in isolation. 
Turning to the predictions of the accounts
formulated to explain the language deficits in
children with ASD, the data from the present study
do not support the deficits in Theory of Mind
account because the children with ASD did not
show difficulties in the Communicative Role-Taking
section, the Questions Asking section, and the
Mental State Representation and False Belief items
of the Narrative task. The Executive Function
deficits account was also not supported because
the children with ASD did not show difficulties
across all sections of the task, although all sections
require planning and organization. The uneven
profile of the children with ASD and the dissociation
of the children’s performance in the different
sections of the pragmatics task strongly support
the multiple deficits account, according to which
the deficits of individuals with ASD stem from a
number of distinct deficits in core cognitive
processes. The data are also compatible with the
weak central cohesion account because the
deficits attested in the children with ASD that we
tested related to reference and temporal cohesion,
domains that require global-local processing.
Limitations and future research 
This is the first systematic study addressing a
wide range of pragmatic abilities in high
functioning Greek-speaking children with ASD.
The study has important strengths in terms of the
participant selection: a narrow age-range of the
participants, strict inclusion and exclusion criteria
enabling the inclusion of only high functioning
children with ASD with high verbal abilities, and
one-to-one matching of children with ASD to TD
children in their verbal abilities. Another important
strength is that the pragmatics task included items
addressing a wide range of pragmatic abilities.
However, the pragmatics task has also limitations:
it included a small number of items for each one of
the domains tested and an imbalance in the
number of items per domain. Another limitation of
the present study is that we did not include any EF
tasks. Therefore, it was not possible to address
possible correlations between the children’s
performance on EF tasks and their scores in the
pragmatics task sections. 
Future research could include a set of EF tasks
to address the relationship between EFs and
pragmatic abilities. It should also include a larger
number of items in each pragmatic domain in order
to investigate the children’s strengths and
weakness in more depth. Inclusion of an additional
group of low functioning children with ASD could
address the independent contribution of verbal and
non-verbal abilities in the children’s performance of
pragmatics. Finally, a longitudinal or a cross-
sectional design could address developmental
aspects of pragmatic abilities. This is especially
relevant for narrative tasks because narrative
abilities are not thought to be fully developed until
nine years of age. 
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Πραγματολογικές ικανότητες παιδιών με αυτισμό υψηλής
λειτουργικότητας και μητρική γλώσσα την Ελληνική
ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ ΜΑΡΙΝΗΣ1, ΑΡΧΟΝΤΩ ΤΕΡΖΗ2
ΑΓΓΕΛΙΚΗ ΚΩΤΣΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ3 & ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΟΣ ΦΡΑΝΣΙΣ4
Το άρθρο παρουσιάζει τα ευρήματα μελέτης των πραγματολογικών ικανοτήτων
παιδιών με αυτισμό και μητρική γλώσσα την Ελληνική που διεξήχθη στο πλαίσιο
μιας ευρύτερης έρευνας επί των γραμματικών ικανοτήτων των παιδιών με αυτι-
σμό. Παρουσιάζεται ανάλυση των πραγματολογικών ικανοτήτων 20 παιδιών με αυτισμό υψηλής λειτουργι-
κότητας και της ομάδας ελέγχου ίδιας ηλικίας, με τυπική ανάπτυξη, σε δοκιμασία βασισμένη στο πρωτό-
κολλο DELV (Diagnostic Evaluation of Language Variation). Η δοκιμασία αξιολογεί τους τομείς των επικοι-
νωνιακών ρόλων, της αφήγησης και της παραγωγής ερωτήσεων. 
Οι δύο ομάδες διέφεραν μόνο στον τομέα της αφήγησης, ειδικότερα, ως προς την αναφορά και τη
χρονική σύνδεση, αλλά είχαν παρόμοια απόδοση στην κατανόηση νοητικών καταστάσεων και στη δοκιμα-
σία εσφαλμένης πεποίθησης. Η χαμηλότερη απόδοση των παιδιών με αυτισμό ως προς την αναφορά μπο-
ρεί να εξηγηθεί από ελλείμματα στη Θεωρία του Νου, παρά την καλή απόδοσή τους στην κατανόηση νοη-
τικών καταστάσεων και στη δοκιμασία εσφαλμένης πεποίθησης, αν υποθέσουμε ότι η αναφορά εμπλέκει
έναν επιπλέον βαθμό δυσκολίας, αυτόν της ποσοτικοποίησης των πληροφοριών που είναι διαθέσιμες στον
ακροατή. Η χαμηλότερη απόδοση των παιδιών με αυτισμό στη χρονική σύνδεση συμφωνεί με προβλήμα-
τα που έχουν διαπιστωθεί ως προς την οργάνωση επεισοδίων σε ενότητες με συνοχή. Το προφίλ που προ-
κύπτει από την παραπάνω δοκιμασία, και ειδικότερα η έλλειψη συσχέτισης ανάμεσα στα διάφορα μέρη της,
δείχνει ότι τα ελλείμματα των ατόμων με αυτισμό ενδεχομένως να προέρχονται από διαφορετικά ελλείμ-
ματα σε κεντρικές γνωστικές διαδικασίες. 
Λέξεις-κλειδιά: Αυτισμός, πραγματολογία, Ελληνικά, αναφορά, Θεωρία του Νου, Θεωρία Κεντρικής Συ-
νοχής.
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